

Message Text

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ACTION NEA-10

INFO OCT-01 AF-06 EUR-12 ISO-00 IO-10 CIAE-00 DODE-00

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R 071300Z JAN 76

FM AMEMBASSY CAIRO

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 9012

INFO AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI

AMEMBASSY ALGIERS

AMEMBASSY AMMAN

AMEMBASSY BEIRUT POUCH

AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS

AMEMBASSY DOHA

AMEMBASSY JIDDA

AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM

AMEMBASSY KUWAIT

AMEMBASSY MANAMA

AMEMBASSY MUSCAT

AMEMBASSY RABAT

AMEMBASSY SANA

AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI

AMEMBASSY TUNIS

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

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KUWAIT POUCH BAGHDAD

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TAGS: PFOR, EG, XF

SUBJECT: FAHMY FOREIGN POLICY STATEMENT

REF: A. FBIS AMMAN JN051215Y B. CAIRO 0136

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SUMMARY. FONMIN FAHMY'S JANUARY 5 MAJOR REVIEW OF GOE FOREIGN POLICY SEEMED DESIGNED ABOVE ALL TO PROVIDE PLO WITH ALTERNATIVE TO SYRIA IN FORTHCOMING UNSC DEBATE AND CAIRO MEDIA CONCENTRATED ATTENTION ON THIS PORTION OF HIS REMARKS (REF B).

FAHMY ALSO EXTENDED OLIVE BRANCH TO PRESIDENT ASAD AND SYRIAN PEOPLE WHILE RENEWING CRITICISM OF BA'ATH. AS EVIDENCE FOR GOE DEDICATION TO ARAB CAUSE, FAHMY CLAIMED CREDIT FOR CHANGING US STAND AGAINST OPEC, STOPPING PERSHING MISSILE SALE TO ISRAEL, BRINGING ABOUT A TRANSFORMATION IN US PERCEPTION OF ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT AND THE RIGHT OF PALESTINIANS, AND CONCLUSION OF NUMEROUS BILATERAL AGREEMENTS BENEFICIAL TO EGYPT. FAHMY ALSO HAD HIGH PRAISE FOR NEW RELATIONSHIP WITH EUROPEANS, MOST NOTABLY FRANCE. ON USSR, HE MADE DETAILED, MODERATE STATEMENT WHICH PORTRAYED EGYPT AS INJURED PARTY FOR REASONS GOE UNABLE TO COMPREHEND, AND REAFFIRMED GOE'S ADHERENCE TO FRIENDSHIP TREATY. HE REITERATED IN STRONG TERMS GOE'S POSITION OF NON-INTERFERENCE BY OUTSIDE PARTIES IN LEBANON AND ANGOLA (SEPTELS). END SUMMARY.

1. ALL CAIRO DAILIES JANUARY 6 HEADLINED DEPRIMIN/FONMIN FAHMY'S THREE-HOUR PRESENTATION ON EGYPTIAN FOREIGN POLICY TO COMMITTEES OF PEOPLES ASSEMBLY ON JANUARY 5 (FULL TEXT REF MSG). PAPERS GAVE MAJOR STRESS TO STATEMENTS ON JANUARY 12 UNSC MEETING AND PALESTINIANS (REF B). SIGNIFICANT EXCERPTS ON OTHER SUBJECTS FOLLOW.

2. AFTER LONG PASSAGES PRAISING SADAT'S LEADERSHIP AND THE GREAT VICTORY OF THE OCTOBER WAR, FAHMY SAID: THE GLORIOUS DAYS OF THE MILITARY BATTLE SAW THE GREATEST PROCESSION OF SOLIDARITY AMONG ALL THE PEOPLES OF THE ARAB NATION. THIS WAS BROUGHT ABOUT AS A RESULT OF PRECISE PLANNING AND PREPARATION. THE CLAIM THAT THE SECOND DISENGAGEMENT AGREEMENT DEALT A BLOW TO ARAB SOLIDARITY IS NO EXCUSE FOR INACTION AND POLITICAL BANKRUPTCY. THIS AGREEMENT IS NO DIFFERENT FROM THE TWO PREVIOUS AGREEMENTS ON THE EGYPTIAN AND SYRIAN FRONTS. IT HAS NOT KEPT EGYPT OUT OF THE CRUCIAL BATTLE, BECAUSE EGYPT'S COMMITMENT TO THE NATIONAL BATTLE IS A GENUINE COMMITMENT STEMMING FROM OUR FAITH IN OUR ARABISM.

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3. EGYPT IS READY TO RESTORE THE SITUATION TO WHAT IT WAS DURING THE GLORIOUS OCTOBER DAYS AND TO FOREGO ALL THAT HAS HAPPENED WITH THE SPIRIT OF ARAB TOLERANCE, ON THE BASIS OF THE FOLLOWING THREE CONSIDERATIONS:

A. WE DO NOT BELIEVE IN THE EXISTENCE OF ANY CONFLICT BETWEEN THE REAL INTERESTS OF TWO ARAB PEOPLES.

B. THE SYRIAN PRESIDENT AND THE FRATERNAL SYRIAN PEOPLE
OCCUPY A SPECIAL PLACE IN OUR HEARTS BECAUSE OF THEIR
HONORABLE RECORD IN THE SERVICE OF THE ARAB CAUSE AND THE
COMMON STRUGGLE.

C. THE ARMS COMRADESHIP BETWEEN US BEFORE AND DURING
THE OCTOBER WAR CANNOT BE FORGOTTEN IN THE MIDST OF THE
POLITICAL OUBIDDING AND CONVULSIONS TO WHICH THE SYRIAN
BA'ATHISTS HAVE RESORTED.

4. OUR BASIC NATIONAL OBJECTIVES AT THIS STAGE IN THE
HISTORY OF OUR ARAB NATION ARE CLEAR. THEY ARE: THE
LIBERATION OF VERY INCH OF THE OCCUPIED ARAB LAND AND THE

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INFO AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI

AMEMBASSY ALGIERS

AMEMBASSY AMMAN

AMEMBASSY BEIRUT

AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS

AMEMBASSY DOHA

AMEMBASSY JIDDA

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AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

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ACHIEVEMENT OF THE NATIONAL RIGHTS OF THE PALESTINIAN
PEOPLE, ESPECIALLY THEIR RIGHT TO ESTABLISH THE POLITICAL
ENTITY THEY DESIRE ON THEIR LIBERATED LAND.

5. WHEN THE ARABS USED THE OIL WEAPON IN THE BATTLE IN
OCTOBER 1973, THE UNITED STATES TOGETHER WITH A FEW
WESTERN CIRCLES LAUNCHED A FIERCE CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE
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ARABS. AT THE BEGINNING OF 1974, THE US GOVERNMENT CALLED
FOR THE CONVENING OF A CONFERENCE IN WASHINGTON WITH
THE AIM OF ESTABLISHING A CARTEL TO EXERT PRESSURE ON THE
OIL-PRODUCING COUNTRIES. EGYPT FELT THAT ITS PAN-ARAB DUTY
PROMPTED IT TO PUT AN END TO THIS CAMPAIGN. ON 5 JANUARY 1975
I SENT A MESSAGE TO SECRETARY OF STATE HENRY KISSINGER IN
WHICH I POINTED OUT THE GRAVE CONSEQUENCES WHICH COULD
RESULT FROM THAT US BEHAVIOR. I DEMANDED THAT HE PUT AN
END TO THAT OPPRESSIVE CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE ARAB COUNTRIES.

6. WE STOPPED THE PERSHING DEAL TO ISRAEL. THIS ACTION
IS LINKED TO THE EFFORTS WHICH EGYPT IS MAKING TO INSURE
THAT THE BALANCE OF MILITARY STRENGTH BETWEEN THE ARAB
CONFRONTATION FORCES AND ISRAEL WILL NOT BE TIPPED. SINCE
THE UNITED STATES IS ALMOST THE ONLY SOURCE WHICH ARMS ISRAEL
AT PRESENT, INTENSIFIED CONTACTS HAVE BEEN HELD WITH THE
US GOVERNMENT IN THIS RESPECT. THESE CONTACTS HAVE HAD
A RESPONSE IN WASHINGTON, PARTICULARLY THE CONTACTS WHICH
WERE HELD IN THE PAST FOUR MONTHS CONCERNING THE PERSHING
MISSILE DEAL WHICH, IT SAID, THE UNITED STATES
THOUGHT OF CONCLUDING WITH ISRAEL. I MADE A STATEMENT ON
21 SEPTEMBER 1975 THAT THE ACQUISITION BY ISRAEL OF THESE
SOPHISTICATED US ARMS, PARTICULARLY THE PERSHING MISSILES,
WOULD CREATE AN OBVIOUS IMBALANCE IN THE FORCES IN THE
MIDDLE EAST AND DRIFT THE AREA INTO A NEW STAGE IN WHICH
THE ARMS RACE WOULD INCREASE TO A SERIOUS DEGREE. THE
PRESIDENT ALSO SENT A MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT FORD ON THE SAME
SUBJECT.

7. THE PRESIDENT'S VISIT TO THE UNITED STATES IS A STEP
TOWARD THE RECTIFICATION OF THE COURSE OF US POLICY.
DURING THE VISIT, THE PRESIDENT MADE 12 SPEECHES IN
ADDITION TO THE SPEECH HE MADE TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY ON
29 OCTOBER. HE ALSO HELD FIVE PRESS CONFERENCES WHICH

WERE CONVEYED OVER AMERICAN AND INTERNATIONAL INFORMATION MEDIA TO MILLIONS OF READERS AND VIEWERS. IT CAN BE SAID THAT THIS VISIT HAS LED TO THE FOLLOWING: (1) AFFIRMATION AND CONSOLIDATION OF THE EGYPTIAN LINE BASED ON THE REJECTION OF KEEPING THE MIDDLE EAST SITUATION AT A STANDSTILL AND THE NEED TO KEEP THE MOMENTUM UNTIL A JUST AND DURABLE PEACE IS REACHED; (2) PRESENTATION OF THE UNCLASSIFIED

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STRONGEST CASE ON BEHALF OF THE PALESTINE ISSUE SINCE THE EMERGENCE OF THE ARAB-ISRAELI DISPUTE ON THE VARIOUS OFFICIAL AND POPULAR LEVELS ON THE AMERICAN CONTINENT; (3) NEUTRALIZATION AND CONTAINMENT OF THE PRESSURES APPLIED BY ISRAEL AND ITS SUPPORTERS ON US POLICY MAKERS IN THE MONTHS THAT PRECEDED THE VISIT; (4) EXPANSION OF THE HORIZON OF AMERICAN UNDERSTANDING OF THE ARAB ISSUE AND EGYPTIAN POLICY IN THE DEPARTMENTS RESPONSIBLE, PARTICULARLY IN THE US EXECUTIVE BRANCH, WHICH HAS EXTENSIVE POWERS AND MANY OF WHOSE MEMBERS ARE KNOWN TO BE INFLUENCED BY ISRAELI INTERESTS AND ZIONIST PRESSURES; (5) THE CONCLUSION OF IMPORTANT AGREEMENTS, FOREMOST THE NUCLEAR COOPERATION AGREEMENT. AGREEMENT STIPULATES COOPERATION BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES IN THE CONSTRUCTION AND OPERATION OF NUCLEAR REACTORS AND GENERATORS NECESSARY FOR DESALINATION AND RESEARCH RELATED TO USE OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL. EGYPT WILL OBTAIN NUCLEAR REACTORS CAPABLE OF GENERATING ENERGY TOTALING ABOUT 1,500 MEGAWATTS IN ADDITION TO SUPPLYING EGYPT WITH ENRICHED URANIUM. IN ADDITION, AN AGREEMENT WAS SIGNED TO PREVENT DOUBLE TAXATION WITH THE AIM OF ATTRACTING AMERICAN CAPITAL FOR INVESTMENT PROJECTS IN EGYPT. AN AGREEMENT ON CULTURAL AND TECHNICAL EXCHANGES AND AN AGREEMENT ON HEALTH COOPERATION WERE ALSO SIGNED. FINALLY, AN AGREEMENT WAS SIGNED UNDER WHICH EGYPT WILL OBTAIN ABOUT ONE MILLION TONS OF AMERICAN WHEAT AND FLOUR IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF LAW 480 WHICH ALLOWS THE US GOVERNMENT TO SELL SURPLUS AGRICULTURAL PRODUCE ON EASY TERMS. THIS WILL LEAD TO A STRONG PUSH FORWARD FOR TECHNOLOGY IN EGYPT AS WELL AS FOR THE VARIOUS INDUSTRIES, INCLUDING THE DEFENSE INDUSTRIES.

8. FAHMY REVIEWED GOE'S EXPANDING RELATIONS WITH OTHER

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FM AMEMBASSY CAIRO

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INFO AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI

AMEMBASSY ALGIERS

AMEMBASSY AMMAN

AMEMBASSY BEIRUT POUCH

AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS

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AMEMBASSY MUSCAT

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AMEMBASSY SANA

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KUWAIT POUCH BAGHDAD

COUNTRIES, NOTABLY FRANCE, AND THEN MADE FOLLOWING
EXPOSITION OF RELATIONS WITH USSR: WE DO NOT CONSIDER
THE USSR SIMPLE AS AN EXPORTER OF ARMS, BUT WE CONSIDER
IT AND DEAL WITH IT AS A FRIENDLY STATE WITH WHICH WE ARE
BOUND BY MUTUAL INTERESTS AND COOPERATION WHICH HAS CONTINUED
FOR MORE THAN 20 YEARS. WE HAVE PUT ON RECORD THE FACT
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THAT THE USSR HAS STOOD ON OUR SIDE DURING THE MOST SERIOUS
CHALLENGES WHICH EGYPT HAS FACED IN THIS PERIOD. IT BUILT
AND DEVELOPED EGYPT'S MILITARY CAPABILITY AND ECONOMY AND
BOOSTED ITS INDUSTRY. THIS IS IN ADDITION TO SOVIET SUPPORT

FOR ARAB RIGHTS. I FEEL THAT THERE ARE NO PROBLEMS BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES RESULTING FROM A DIFFERENCE IN IDEOLOGIES OR STANDS ON SPECIFIC INTERNATIONAL PROBLEMS. IF WE CAST A GLANCE AT THE RECORD OF VOTING IN THE UNITED NATIONS, FOR INSTANCE, WE WILL FIND THAT THE TWO COUNTRIES HAVE TAKEN VERY CLOSE, ALMOST SIMILAR STANDS, IN THEIR VOTES ON ALL UN RESOLUTIONS. BUT THE POINT WHICH I WOULD LIKE TO PRESENT TO YOU IS THAT THE REALTIONSHIP BETWEEN A CERTAIN STATE AND A SUPER POWER IS DIFFERENT FROM THE GENERAL MODE OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS. WE FIND THAT THE TWO SUPER POWERS ARE MOVING ALONG THE COURSE OF DETENTE BECAUSE THEY REALIZE THAT THIS SERVES THEIR INTERESTS. THE USSR'S VIEW OF THE MIDDLE EAST PROBLEM AND THE PRIORITY IT MUST BE GIVEN IS ESSENTIALLY AFFECTED BY THE CONSIDERATIONS OF DETENTE. WHEN WE MAKE A COMPARISON BETWEEN THE USSR'S ATTITUDE TOWARD US AND US ATTITUDE TOWARD ISRAEL, WE FIND THAT THE UNITED STATES IS GIVING LIMITLESS SUPPORT TO ISRAEL IN ALL FIELDS WHILE SOVIET SUPPORT TO A PART OF THE ARAB WORLD IS GIVEN WITHIN CAUTIOUS LIMITS AND ON THE BASIS OF CONSERVATIVE CALCULATIONS. FOR OUR PART, WE ARE INTENT ON MAINTAINING THE STRONGEST RELATIONS WITH THE USSR AND STRIVING TO CONTINUE THE COOPERATION BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES AND TO DEVELOP THIS COOPERATION AS LONG AS THIS IS THE MUTUAL DESIRE. I WOULD LIKE TO PARTICULARLY REFER TO THE TRADE PROTOCOL WHICH WAS INITIALLED IN CAIRO ON 13 DECEMBER 1975 TO REGULATE TRADE BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES THIS YEAR. UNDER THIS PROTOCOL, EGYPT WILL EXPORT GOODS TO THE USSR TO A VALUE OF 195 MILLION POUNDS AND IMPORT GOODS FROM THE USSR TO A VALUE OF 125 MILLION POUNDS. THIS MEANS THAT EGYPT IS PAYING ITS CIVIL DEBTS ANNUALLY AND THAT THE INSTALLMENT IT IS PAYING IS INCREASING YEAR AFTER YEAR.

9. ONE OF THE OUTSTANDING PROBLEMS BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES IS THE QUESTION OF SCHEDULING DEBTS. THESE ARE MILITARY DEBTS. ALTHOUGH MOST STATES HAVE WRITTEN OFF ALL OR PART OF THE MILITARY DEBTS, ESPECIALLY WHEN SUCH DEBTS ARE BETWEEN FRIENDLY COUNTRIES, EGYPT WILL NOT--EVEN GIVEN ALL OF THIS-- EVADE ITS DEBTS AND WILL SETTLE ITS OBLIGATIONS. THE LINE
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BETWEEN MILITARY DEBTS AND MILITARY COOPERATION CONCERNING ARMAMENTS AND THE CONTINUATION OF COOPERATION AND THE SUPPLYING OF SPARE PARTS IS A MATTER WHICH IS BEYOND ANY DOUBT, AND IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO SEPARATE THESE TWO SUBJECTS. WE FIND THAT FIRST WE STILL NEED AN ANSWER TO THE FACT THAT THE SOVIET UNION HAS NOT REPLACED WHAT WE LOST IN THE OCTOBER WAR DESPITE THE PROVISION IN ARTICLE VIII OF THE TREATY OF FRIENDSHIP AND COOPERATION WHICH SAYS THAT TO STRENGTHEN EGYPT'S DEFENSE CAPABILITY THE TWO SIDES WOULD CONTINUE TO DEVELOP APPROPRIATE AGREEMENTS BETWEEN THEM. OUR ASTONISHMENT, IN FACT, GOES BEYOND THAT WHEN WE SEE THE SOVIET UNION NOT

COOPERATING AT ALL CONCERNING THE SPARE PARTS NECESSARY FOR THE AIRCRAFT AND ALSO CONCERNING THE SUPPLYING OF SPARE PARTS FOR THE WEAPONS IMPORTED FROM THE SOVIET UNION. THE FAILURE TO SUPPLY THE SPARE PARTS WE NEED IS THE RESULT OF A POLITICAL DECISION FOR WHICH WE ON OUR PART CANNOT FIND ANY INTERPRETATION DESPITE OUR NUMEROUS ATTEMPTS, ESPECIALLY SINCE WE FIND THIS ATTITUDE TO BE IN BASIC CONTRADICTION WITH SOVIET OBLIGATIONS FROM THE ASPECTS OF FRIENDSHIP AND OUR TREATY, WHICH IS AN INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT BETWEEN TWO FRIENDS, AND, IN PARTICULAR, CONTRARY TO THE LETTER AND SPIRIT OF ARTICLE VII OF THIS TREATY. NO ONE SHOULD IMAGINE--AND WE REFUSE TO--THAT IT IS DUE TO THE MOSCOW LEADERS' DESIRE TO WEAKEN EGYPT. WHAT IS IMPORTANT IS THAT FRIENDSHIP BETWEEN US AND THE SOVIET UNION CONTINUES TO STAND AS CRYSTALLIZED IN THE TREATY AND, CONTRARY TO THE RUMORS SPREAD BY CERTAIN QUARTERS, THIS TREATY WILL CONTINUE TO EXIST AS LONG AS THE LEADERS OF THE TWO COUNTRIES FEEL THAT IT IS AN EFFECTIVE INSTRUMENT FOR DEVELOPING RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES.
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